



Electric Utility Residential Customer Charges and Minimum Bills:

Alternative Approaches for Recovering Basic Distribution Costs

By Jim Lazar¹

Electric utilities have certain costs that do not vary with the usage of electricity. It is generally accepted that these include the costs of metering, billing, and payment processing. These costs are most often recovered through what is variously called a “customer charge” or a “service charge” or a “basic charge.” In the United Kingdom, this is known as a “standing charge.”

Regardless of the title, it is a charge (usually less than \$10/month for residential service) that is levied each month regardless of electricity usage, with additional charges applying for each kilowatt-hour of electricity consumed. For most utilities in the US, the customer charge covers the cost of billing and collection, and perhaps other customer-specific costs like meter reading, but not the costs of distribution facilities like poles, conductors, or transformers.

Nearly all electric utilities worldwide bundle the cost of distribution service, as well as the power supply cost, into a usage charge, calculated as a price per kilowatt-hour. This is consistent with how competitive firms price their products, whether it is gasoline, groceries, or hotel rooms: the price per unit recovers all of the costs involved in producing, transporting, and retailing of goods and services.

Some rate analysts argue that a portion of the distribution system – poles, wires, and transformers – constitute a fixed cost that does not vary with sales and should be included in the fixed customer charge. Some recent proposals from electric utilities reflect this view. This is controversial.

Many state regulatory authorities rejected this approach when they held hearings and made determinations under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978.² The Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, for example, explicitly rejected the concept that distribution costs were customer-related in nature:

In this case, the only directive the Commission will give regarding future cost of service studies is to repeat its rejection of the inclusion of the costs of a minimum-sized distribution system among customer-related costs. As the Commission

*stated in previous orders, the minimum system method is likely to lead to the double allocation of costs to residential customers and over-allocation of costs to low-use customers. Costs such as meter reading, billing, the cost of meters and service drops, are properly attributable to the marginal cost of serving a single customer. The cost of a minimum sized system is not. The parties should not use the minimum system approach in future studies.*³

However, as sales have flattened or declined in recent years, and as more customers install on-site generating resources but remain dependent on grid services for some service, the concept of recovering distribution network costs in fixed charges has experienced resurgence.

Utility sales volumes in some regions have stagnated or declined as appliances, homes, equipment and systems become more efficient. Sales volumes also vary with weather, declining in mild years. Many state net-metering laws allow consumers installing rooftop solar arrays to incur net-bills for zero or very few kilowatt-hours, depending on the geographic location and the design of the net-metering tariff. To improve revenue stability, and to collect distribution system costs from PV customers, some utilities are arguing that “fixed” costs should be recovered in fixed customer charges. Some utilities are seeking customer charges of \$20/month or more. In one extreme case, Madison Gas and Electric Company proposed a \$69/month customer charge, to recover all costs except for fuel and purchased power expenses.⁴ The Wisconsin PUC recently voted 2-1 to approve an increase in the customer charge to

-
- 1 Rich Sedano, Janine Migden-Ostrander, Brenda Hausauer and Camille Kadoch provided reviews.
 - 2 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §§2601-2645 (1978). Available at: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg3117.pdf>.
 - 3 WUTC v. Puget Sound Power and Light Company, Cause U-89-2688-T, Third Supp. Order, P. 71, 1990.

\$19/month for Wisconsin Public Service Company.⁵

An electric utility has a defined revenue requirement, determined by their regulator. A higher customer charge therefore means a lower per-kWh rate will be required. This has important impacts on the utility and its customers. Utility revenue is stabilized by a high customer charge, independent of weather, conservation, or other impacts on sales. However, the impacts on customers of high customer charges can be inconsistent with policy objectives:

- Small-use customers, such as apartment dwellers, low-income households, and second homes will receive much higher electric bills; the vast majority of low-income consumers are also low-use consumers. This is anathema to public policy objectives that normally tend to protect low-income customers and/or reward low usage;
- Urban area residents who use natural gas for space and water heat will receive much higher electric bills;
- Large-use customers, including large single-family homes in suburban and rural areas without access to natural gas most often will receive lower electric bills, depending on the existing utility rate design; and
- The lower per-kWh prices that result when a significant portion of costs are recovered in a fixed monthly customer charge will stimulate consumption. This creates consequences for incremental utility investment and for the environment. It also reduces the economic incentive for careful customer energy management practices and investment in energy efficiency measures by increasing pay-back periods.

There are several ways besides high fixed charges to address utility revenue stability issues:

- **Financial Reserves:** The traditional approach has been to set rates in a manner that recovers distribution and power costs in a per-kWh charge, and expect utilities to have adequate financial reserves to manage the volatility that occurs with weather. This is reflected in the 40% – 50% equity ratios allowed for electric utilities in determining the cost of capital.
- **Frequent rate cases:** If regulators hold rate proceedings every year or two, there is little time for sales volumes to deviate far from the level used to set volumetric rates.
- **Revenue Decoupling:** Many regulators have adopted revenue regulation mechanisms that calculate a true-up at the end of the month or year to align actual revenues with allowed revenues.

All of these methods allow the per-kWh charge to continue to reflect substantially all of the costs of service. By structuring rates this way, regulators preserve the consumer incentive to use electricity wisely.

Rate Designs with Minimum Bill Charges

One alternative to address utility concerns for revenue adequacy in addition to Revenue Regulation and frequent rate cases is a concept known as a “minimum bill.” A minimum bill guarantees the utility a minimum annual revenue level from each customer, even if their usage is zero. The vast majority of customers, who consume the overwhelming majority of energy, have usage that exceeds those low thresholds. For these customers, a minimum bill “disappears” when the usage passes that level, and the customer effectively pays a volumetric rate to cover both power supply and distribution costs.

It is important to understand that a very small number of customers will be adversely affected by the minimum bill, because a large majority of all customers have usage in excess of the minimum billed amount. Figure 1 compares the number of customers served at each usage level, and the kilowatt-hours used by those customers at each usage level. Only a few percent of the customers, using less than one percent of the energy, have usage below 150 kWh per month in this illustrative example, and are arguably not making a meaningful contribution to system costs when those costs are built into the per-kWh charge.


Table 1 compares three example residential rates, all designed to produce the same total level of residential revenue for an illustrative utility with average usage for this example of 1,000 kWh/month/customer.

- **Low Customer Charge:** \$5/month, to cover billing and collection
- **High Customer Charge:** \$20/month, to cover billing, collection, and a portion of distribution costs
- **Minimum Bill:** \$5.00/month to cover billing and collection, with a minimum bill of \$20 (which applies if usage falls below 150 kWh/month).

4 Application of Madison Gas and Electric Company for Authority to Change Electric and Natural Gas Rates, Docket 3270-UR-120, April 9, 2014. Available at: http://psc.wi.gov/apps40/dockets/content/detail.aspx?dockt_id=3270-UR-120.

5 Content, T. (2014, November 6). State regulators approve 83% increase in Green Bay utility's fixed charge. *Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel*. Retrieved from: www.jsonline.com.

Figure 1



This shows that for the average customer, the three rate designs produce almost identical bills. With a high customer charge rate design, because the \$20 customer charge is collecting \$15 more than the \$5 low customer charge, the price per kWh is lower by \$0.015/kWh. For the minimum bill rate design, however, less than 1% of kWh sales will typically be to those customers using under 150 kWh/month. This group has historically been limited to unoccupied dwellings; more recently, it has come to include customers with solar PV systems that produce as many kilowatt-hours as they consume, but remain dependent

Table 1

	kWh	Low Customer Charge	High Customer Charge	\$20 Minimum Bill*
Customer Charge		\$5.00	\$20.00	\$5.00
Minimum Bill				\$20.00
Per-kWh Charge		\$0.10	\$0.085	\$0.099
Customer Bills	10 kWh	\$6.00	\$20.85	\$20.00
	100 kWh	\$15.00	\$28.50	\$20.00
	200 kWh	\$25.00	\$37.00	\$24.80
	500 kWh	\$55.00	\$62.50	\$54.50
	1,000 kWh	\$105.00	\$105.00	\$104.00
	1,500 kWh	\$155.00	\$147.50	\$153.50
	2,000 kWh	\$205.00	\$190.00	\$203.00

*The minimum bill will only apply when customer's usage is so low that their bill falls below \$20.

on the grid to serve as a “battery” taking excess production during the day, and supplying power when the sun is not shining.

Therefore, there will not be a lot of revenue recovered by the minimum bill charge, leaving most of the revenue requirement recovered by the volumetric charge. The per-kWh rate would only be reduced by about \$0.001/kWh (1%) as a result. Under this rate design, very small-use customers, such as PV customers whose panels produce as many kilowatt-hours as the house uses, would pay slightly higher bills. However, as nearly all usage by customers remains priced at a cost-based rate that includes all of the costs of producing and distributing electricity, the low-use PV customer would have negligible usage charges.

Impact on Usage

Electricity usage varies with the price paid. Higher kWh charges create greater incentives for consumers to turn out unneeded lights, manage thermostat settings, and invest in more efficient appliances, windows, and insulation. There is an economic science tool, price elasticity, which measures the expected change in consumption if prices change. Economists variously estimate the price elasticity of demand for electricity in the range of -0.1 to -0.7, with some long-run estimates going higher. An elasticity of -0.2, meaning that a 1% increase in price results in a 0.2% decrease in the quantity demanded, is considered a conservative estimate of long-run price elasticity.

The high customer charge rate design results in a 15% lower price per kilowatt-hour compared to the low customer charge rate design. Assuming an elasticity of -0.2, that would imply that customers would consume about 3% more electricity (-0.2 elasticity x 15% change in rate = 3% change in usage) as a result of the lower per-kWh price.

The minimum bill rate form, on the other hand, only reduces the price per kWh by 1% compared to the low customer charge rate design; assuming the same elasticity factor, the minimum bill design would increase usage by only about 0.2% among customers using more than the minimum billed quantity, when compared with their usage under the low customer charge rate form.

There is, however, a chance that the very small users might increase their usage up to the 150 kWh minimum. With this \$20 minimum bill, customers using less than

150 kWh per month would see no change in their bills if they increased usage up to 150 kWh. But, since only a small percentage of customers use that little power, even if they did so, usage would not increase very much.

Evaluating a choice between a \$20 fixed customer charge and a \$20 minimum bill charge, we would expect about 15 times as much additional usage under the \$20 fixed charge as under the \$20 minimum bill charge.

Impact on PV Customers

Part of the concern that is raised by utilities is that customers with solar PV systems are “net-metering” to zero kWh, and paying only the customer charge in a monthly bill. These customers remain dependent on the grid for storage and shaping of their daytime energy production. Solar advocates argue that the grid is receiving a more valuable product – daytime renewable energy – than it is providing to the customers at night from conventional generation, and that this is a form of rough equity.

A minimum bill would ensure that a PV customer with net consumption of zero would still contribute to system costs. In the example, these customers would pay \$20 per month. But, rather than distort the rate design for all customers, only the low-consumption consumers would be affected, allowing rates that continue to reflect all system costs to be applied to the overwhelming majority of energy sales.

Advantages and Disadvantages

A rate design that uses a customer charge combined with a kWh charge is simple to understand and administer. It provides a clear price signal for each kWh. If the customer charge is lower, the per-kWh charge is higher. However, the public is used to doing business for other purchases with a zero customer charge – grocery stores, gas stations, and virtually all other retailers only charge customers for what they buy, not for the privilege of being a customer (membership warehouse clubs are exceptions, with fees designed to weed out “browsers” from their stores.) There may also be conflict with intended outcomes for low use customers.

A minimum bill rate design has an advantage in that the per-kWh price is higher, more closely reflecting long-run marginal costs (all costs are variable in the long run). This rate design encourages prudent usage, better aligned with

investment impacts from consumption and investment in energy efficiency. This means customer choices about usage and, importantly, energy-related investments, will be informed by electricity prices that reflect long run grid value. The disadvantage is that, for the very small number of customers whose usage is below the “minimum,” this rate design provides no disincentive at all to using the minimum amount of electricity. It can be perceived to have a disadvantage of encouraging additional usage by those users with usage below the minimum billed amount, but there are very few of these customers, and their prospective additional usage increase is minimal. Users in this group may argue that the minimum bill is unfair to them.

Finally, a minimum bill rate form ensures that second-homes, which may have no consumption during the off-season, contribute to utility revenues. This is sometimes presented as an economic justice issue, since second homes are generally held only by upper-income consumers.

Conclusion

The primary purpose of utility regulation is to enforce the pricing discipline on monopolies that competitive markets impose on most firms. Competitive firms nearly always recover all of their costs in the price per unit of their products. Therefore, any fixed monthly charge for electricity service represents a deviation from this underlying principle of utility regulation. The most commonly applied customer charges recover only customer-specific costs, such as billing and collection, in a fixed customer charge, leaving all costs of the shared system to be recovered in usage charges.

A regulator seeking to increase the contribution to utility system costs from those customers with minimal consumption can do so with either a higher customer charge, or establishing a minimum bill. The minimum bill option will ensure that all customers contribute to distribution costs, but without significantly stimulating consumption by higher-use customers or raising the bills of lower-income, low-use customers.

Forthcoming in Second Quarter, 2015: *Electric Rate Design for the Utility of the Future*. Watch for this on our website, www.raonline.org



The Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP)™

Beijing, China • Berlin, Germany • Brussels, Belgium • **Montpelier, Vermont USA** • New Delhi, India
50 State Street, Suite 3 • Montpelier, VT 05602 • phone: +1 802-223-8199 • fax: +1 802-223-8172

www.raonline.org